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COMMENT
CLEAN WATER ACT, SECTION 404
APPLICANTS: MAY THE ODDS BE EVER
IN YOUR FAVOR
JASON BAILEY*

Businesses that engage in projects requiring the disposal of dredged or
fill materialin waters or wetlands of the United States must apply for a
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The permit process,
regulated by section 404 of the Clean Water Act, provides the
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency a distinct role to deny or restrict the
use of defined areas as disposal sites when it detects unacceptable
adverse effects on the environment. The EPA Administrator may
exercise this power "whenever he determines." Until recently, the EPA
never used its so-called "veto power" after a permit's issuance;
however, the EPA did exactly that in 2011, leading to Mingo Logan
Coal Co. v. EPA. Ultimately, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the District
of Columbia held that the word "whenever" within section 404(c) gave
the EPA the ability to use its veto power retrospectively. This Comment
argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals' recent decision will have an
extremely toxic effect on industries across the country. It examines the
history behind section 404 and the recentfederal cases: analyzing the
courts' decisions, Congressionalintent regardingsection 404, and the
harmful effects and vast uncertainty businesses across the country will
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now face. It sets forth a recommendation to Congress and the courts
about how to fix the problem before it becomes detrimental to both
individualindustries and the U.S. economy as a whole.
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"In the business world, the rearview mirror is always clearer than the
windshield."
- Warren Buffett
INTRODUCTION

If Washington, D.C. needed to build a new bridge across the Potomac
River when a current one becomes outdated, then it would need to obtain a
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), section 404 permit.' If Honolulu International

1.

See Clean Water Act (CWA) § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (detailing the

requirements to obtain a permit for dredged or fill material under the Clean Water Act);
see also EPA OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, MANAGING YOUR ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES: A PLANNING GUIDE FOR CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 27

(2005)

[hereinafter

EPA PLANNING

GUIDE],

available at http://www.epa.gov/
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Airport needed to extend its runways into Mdmala Bay to accommodate
larger planes, then it would also need to obtain a section 404 permit. 2 If the
United States government follows through with the Keystone XL pipeline
and builds it in areas where water or wetlands exist, then it, too, would
require a section 404 permit. 3 What would have been a routine task a few
years ago now involves abundant uncertainty at the behest of the
Environmental Protection Agency.
Business activities such as development, water resource projects,
infrastructure expansion, and mining ventures require a CWA, section 404
permit before discharging dredged or fill material into U.S. waters.
Although the permit is issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
("Army Corps"), the EPA has veto power over parts of the application.
For the first time, in Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA ("Mingo Logan"),

federal courts examined whether the EPA could use its section 404(c)
power to retrospectively withdraw disposal site specifications after a permit
6
has been issued by the Army Corps.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in Mingo
Logan that the text of section 404(c) does not put a time limit on the EPA
Administrator's authority to withdraw a permit's specification, but instead,
empowers him to "prohibit, restrict or withdraw the specification
'whenever' . .. ."' In March 2014, the Supreme Court chose not to hear the

case and denied Mingo Logan Coal Co.'s petition for writ of certiorari. 8
This case of first impression, decided forty-one years after Congress passed
the CWA, will have a destructive effect on industries that rely on a CWA,

compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/constructmyer/myerguide.pdf
(explaining that the building of any structure in waters of the United States requiring
rock, sand, dirt, or other material for its construction requires a § 404 permit).
See § 1344 (noting that guidelines for each disposal site shall be based upon
2.
criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the territorial seas, the contiguous zone,
and the ocean); see also EPA PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 25 ("You need a
section 404 permit if your construction project will result in the discharge of dredged
material ..... ).
3. See § 1344 (requiring permits for discharge into navigable waters); see also
EPA PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 25 (distinguishing that a § 404 permit is
required not only for the discharge of dredged material, but also for fill material).
4.
See § 1344 (establishing a program to issue and regulate permits for dredged or
fill material).
5. See § 1344(c) (establishing the EPA Administrator's authorization to prohibit
the specification of any defined area as a disposal site).
See generally Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C.
6.
2012), rev'd, 714 F.3d 608 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014).
7. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d at 613, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540
(2014) (emphasis added).
8. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014).
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section 404 permit if the EPA is able to revoke permits whenever it
chooses, including years after issuance. 9 Even avid supports of the federal
regulatory regime may be skeptical about the uncertainty of the EPA's
power and how it will loom over businesses and their investors.10
This Comment argues that the court of appeals' recent decision in Mingo
Logan will have an extremely toxic effect on industries across the country,
and Congress is responsible for remedying the situation before it spirals out
of control. Part II discusses the background and evolution of the pertinent
section of the CWA and why it has been controversial. It gives a detailed
factual and procedural history of the recent cases that brought this issue to
light. Part III then analyzes the plain meaning of the statute at issue and its
legislative history to determine whether the Court of Appeals' decision
deviates from the legislation's original intent and how it, nevertheless,
leaves industries in a position of insecurity and instability. Part IV sets
forth recommendations to Congress and to courts that will inevitably
decide similar cases in the future. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
U.S. Court of Appeals' recent unprecedented ruling will have a destructive
effect on a vast array of industries and that the courts and Congress should
take action to provide additional guidance as to how and when the EPA can
invoke its section 404(c) veto power.
I.

THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE EPA'S SECTION 404(c) POWER

This Section supplies pertinent background information on CWA,
section 404, including its original purpose. Specifically, it provides an indepth discussion of the EPA's veto power" as set forth by section 404(c) of
the CWA. After discussing past instances when the EPA used its power
and the subsequent court battles, it addresses the recent rulings in Mingo
9.

See 714 F.3d at 613 (construing the EPA's power set forth in § 404 to be

infinite and without a time limit).
10.

See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (1st ed.

1977).
11. The term "veto power" is used throughout this Comment because even though
the statute describes the EPA Administrator's authority as the ability to prohibit
specifications and deny or restrict the use of those areas, id.; cf Am. Forest & Paper
Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556
F.2d 1282, 1285 (5th Cir. 1977)) (reviewing the EPA's ability to veto a proposed
permit to discharge pollutants if it concludes that the permit violates the CWA § 402
criteria protecting endangered species and holding that the EPA does not enjoy wide
latitude in deciding whether to approve or reject a state's proposed permit program
because "unless the Administrator of the EPA determines that the proposed state
program does not meet [the specified] requirements, he must approve the proposal"),
this essentially provides the EPA with veto power over any and all disposal site
specifications considered by the Army Corps. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se.
Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 274 (2009) ("We, and the parties, refer to
[CWA § 404(c)] as the EPA's power to veto a permit.").
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Logan and why this case of first impression has the potential to inflict
unnecessary risk and confusion on the business community.
A. Clean Water Act, Section 404 and its ProvisionAllowing the EPA Veto
Power over an Application's Site Specifications

Section 404 of the CWA provides the required steps an entity must take
before discharging dredged or fill material into the waters or wetlands of
the United States.12 It is an umbrella statute covering many U.S. business
activities. 13 Regardless of the entity applying for a permit, each project is
analyzed independently, and every industry is expected to take certain
precautions to protect the environment from unnecessary harm.14 Dredged
and fill material are treated the same for the purposes of the statute.' 5
Section 404 regulates activities through a permit review process that
addresses the application, specification, and denial or restriction of disposal
sites at which an entity may discharge dredged or fill material. 16 The Army
Corps, limited by public interest and environmental criteria, reviews and
issues individual permits.1 7 Although the Secretary of the Army, acting

12.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012) (delineating the process from application and

specification of disposal sites to required public hearings and issuance from the Army
Corps).

13.

See Water: Discharge of Dredged or Fill Materials (404), U.S. EPA,

http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/
(last visited July 2, 2014)
("Activities in waters of the United States regulated under this program include fill for
development, water resource projects (such as dams and levees), infrastructure
development (such as highways and airports) and mining projects.").
14. See id. ("The basic premise of the program is that no discharge of dredged or
fill material may be permitted if: (1) a practicable alternative exists that is less
damaging to the aquatic environment or (2) the nation's waters would be significantly
degraded. In other words, when you apply for a permit, you must first show that steps
have been taken to avoid impacts to wetlands, streams and other aquatic resources; that
potential impacts have been minimized; and that compensation will be provided for all
remaining unavoidable impacts."); see also § 1344 (granting the EPA veto power in
instances when the discharge of such materials will have "an unacceptable adverse
effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas . .. wildlife, or
recreational areas").
15. Compare EPA PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 25 (defining "dredged
material" as material that is excavated or dredged from waters in the U.S. and "fill
material" as material placed in the waters of the U.S. where the material has the effect
of "either replacing any portion of water of the United States with dry land or changing
the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States"), with Water:
Discharge of Dredged or Fill Materials (404), supra note 13 (providing additional
definitions of the terms but also examples of projects that categorically fit within each).
16. See § 1344(a)-(c) (describing the discharge of dredged or fill materials permit
process).
17. See id. (setting forth criteria to be taken into consideration throughout the
permit application and review process); cf EPA PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 30
(proffering that applicants must demonstrate compliance with mitigation provisions by
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through the Chief of Engineers, solely handles this aspect of the permit
process, subsection (c) of section 404 provides a distinct role for the EPA:
(c) The [EPA] Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification
(including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a
disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any
defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification)
as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity
for public hearings, that the discharge of such materials into such area
will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . , wildlife, or recreational areas.

Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult with
the Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth in writing and make
public his findings and his reasons for making any determination under
this subsection.
(d) "Secretary" defined. The term "Secretary" as used in this section
means the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of
Engineers.18

B. While the EPA has Exercised its Veto Power in the Past,it has Never
Done so Retroactively After a Permit'sIssuance
The EPA has used its veto power on numerous occasions in the past, and
several instances led to suits against the EPA.19 In the latest case, Hoosier
EnvironmentalCouncil, a riverboat casino needed to acquire a section 404
permit to dredge material from the Ohio River bottom, excavate from the
river bank, and moor piles both in the water and on the bank, among other
activities, to carry out its proposed riverboat gambling project.20 The
plaintiff environmental organizations filed suit claiming that the permit's
issuance was in violation of the CWA and other statutes because neither an
Environmental Impact Statement nor an adequate public interest review
were conducted. 2 1 Although the court noted the effects of a letter from the
showing it will "avoid wetland and water impacts where practicable, minimize
potential impacts to wetlands and waters, and compensate for any remaining,
unavoidable impacts to wetlands or waters through activities to enhance or create
wetlands and/or waters").
18. § 1344(c)-(d) (emphasis added).
19.

See generally Hoosier Envtl. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 105

F. Supp. 2d 953 (S.D. Ind. 2000); City of Alma v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 1546
(S.D. Ga. 1990); Russo Dev. Corp. v. Reilly, No. 87-3916, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15859 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 1990).
20. See Hoosier Envtl. Council, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (emphasizing that the

Army Corps added numerous special conditions to the permit to limit, prevent, or
mitigate the environmental impacts identified in an initial environmental assessment).
21.

See id. at 964 (stating that one of the plaintiff environmental groups' mission,

among others, opposed "any attempt to locate a gambling casino on the Ohio River"
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EPA to the Army Corps two months after the section 404(b) permit was
issued that raised the Army Corps' failure to examine the project's
environmental effects, it failed to consider whether the EPA could have
exercised its section 404(c) veto power after the permit was issued. 22
Two other cases brought to light the controversy surrounding the EPA's
veto power, but in both instances, the EPA used its authority prior to a
permit's issuance. 23 In City of Alma, the EPA obtained an injunction
preventing the city from constructing a lake.24 The Army Corps notified
the EPA of its intent to issue a section 404 permit, and the EPA Regional
Administrator informed the Army Corps and public officials that he would
begin section 404(c) proceedings, proposing to prohibit or restrict the
planned dredging or fill of material at the project site.25 Although the court
determined that the EPA acted within its CWA authority, the EPA acted
before the Army Corps issued the final permit. 26
Furthermore, in Russo Development Corp., although the court did not
analyze the EPA's ability to use its section 404(c) power against a permit
already issued, the court did address whether the EPA could use its section
404(c) veto power in regard to an after-the-fact permit.27 The plaintiff
sought a permit for an area in which filling already began, and the court
determined that the regulations "unquestionably" allowed the EPA to
prevent the Army Corps from issuing a permit to a landowner seeking to
fill wetlands. 28 Thus, the court allowed the EPA to rely on its section
404(c) veto power even after the landowner filled a portion of the land in
within their countv).

22. See id. at 971-72 (discussing the cooperative tone of the EPA's letter and
finding it unlikely that if the EPA knew the permit had already been granted, it would
have accused the Army Corps' environmental assessment of being legally deficient).
23. See City of Alma, 744 F. Supp. at 1553 (recognizing that the EPA's § 404(c)
proceedings took place after the Corps notified the EPA of its intent to issue a § 404
permit but before the permit was formally issued); see also Russo Dev. Corp., 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15859, at *2-3 (reviewing an after-the-fact permit as legally
equivalent to a new permit).
24. See City of Alma, 744 F. Supp. at 1567 (denying the plaintiffs' motion for
lifting the injunction).
25. See id. at 1553 (providing that the Army Corps notified the EPA of its intent to
issue a § 404 permit in 1988 and that the EPA issued its recommendation on October 5,
1988, prior to the permit's issuance).
26. See id. at 1560 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 58,077 (1979)) ("As noted above, the EPA
stated, in the preamble to its regulations, that it would avoid initiating section 404(c)
proceedings after a permit has been issued.").
27. See Russo Dev. Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15859, at *2 (detailing the
plaintiffs after-the-fact permit as to the remaining acreage of an area already with a
permit and an additional parcel).
28. See id. at *8-9 (emphasizing the difference between vetoing an issued permit
and vetoing an after-the-fact permit not issued).
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question prior to seeking an after-the-fact permit. 2 9
The above cases provide a sense of how federal courts have handled the
EPA's statutory authority in controversial situations, but never before had a
court directly examined whether the EPA could use its section 404(c)
power to withdraw disposal site specifications after the Army Corps
lawfully issues a section 404 permit until Mingo Logan.3 0
C. For the First Time in Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, a West Virginia
Company Challenged the EPA's UnprecedentedDecision to Retroactively
Veto a Section 404 Permit

In Mingo Logan, the Army Corps issued a CWA, section 404(b) permit
to Mingo Logan Coal Company in 2007, allowing it to discharge fill
material from its Spruce No. 1 coal mine into nearby streams and their
tributaries.31 Before the permit was issued, the EPA commented on a
preliminary draft of an Environmental Impact Statement, as well as on
another draft a year later, expressing its concerns about each version and
also noting the application did not include information that fully assessed
potential adverse environmental impact associated with the project.32 After
working with the Army Corps, the EPA granted state certification for the
individual permit in December 2005 because it determined the project
would not violate state water quality standards or anti-degradation
regulations.33 Before the Army Corps issued the final permit to Mingo
Logan Coal, the Director of the Office of Environmental Programs,
Environmental Assessment and Innovation Division, of the EPA wrote that
the EPA had no intention of seeking section 404(c) proceedings regarding
the Spruce Mine project.34
In September 2009, almost two years after the Army Corps issued the
section 404 permit, the EPA sent a letter to the Office of the Army Corps,

29.

See id. (noting that the original permit authorized the fill that occurred up to

that point but that the after-the-fact permit had yet to be issued).
30. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2012),
rev'd, 714 F.3d 608 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014) (articulating
that the EPA's attempt to withdraw the specification of discharge sites after a permit
has been issued is unprecedented in the history of the CWA).
31. See id. at 133-34 (specifying the sites as the Pigeonroost and Oldhouse
Branches).
32. See id. at 135-36 (detailing the EPA's comment dates as August 2001 and
August 2002, respectively).
33. Id. at 136.
34. See id. (explaining that this statement occurred via email on November 2,
2006, from William J. Hoffman, Director of the Office of Environmental Programs,
Environmental Assessment and Innovation Division of the EPA, to Teresa Spagna of
the Army Corps).
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requesting that it suspend, revoke, or modify Mingo Logan Coal's issued
permit.3 5 Finding no grounds to suspend, revoke, or modify the permit
because no new information had surfaced related to water quality impacts,
the Army Corps rejected the EPA's request. 36 The EPA then invoked its
section 404(c) veto power in January 2011, withdrawing the specification
of two waterways and their tributaries as disposal sites for materials in
connection with the construction of the Spruce No. 1 Surface Mine. 3 7 This
fundamentally rendered the permit ineffective by taking away eighty-eight
percent of the total discharge area the permit authorized, and it eventually
led to the dispute in Mingo Logan, which is whether the EPA still possesses
its veto power after a permit has been issued.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted the
coal company's Motion for Summary Judgment on multiple bases. 3 9 First,
the court decided that a retrospective veto power is not discussed in Section
404(c) and that an interpretation of such is contrary to the language,
structure, and legislative history of section 404 as a whole. 4 0 The decision
asked whether the EPA could withdraw a decision it has not made.4 1 Using
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. and Collins v. National Transportation
Safety Board in its analysis, the court concluded that de novo review was
appropriate and that the EPA was not entitled to any deference. 4 2

35. See id. at 136-37 (emphasizing that the Army Corps' permit issued on January
22, 2007, contained an express notification that the regional Army Corps office may
reevaluate its decision on the permit at any time the circumstances warranted without
saying anything about the EPA's authority to withdraw the specification of a discharge
site or to modify or revoke the permit).
36. See id. at 137 (articulating that the EPA's letter specifically asserted that
"recent data and analyses had revealed downstream water quality impacts that were not
adequately addressed by the permit").
37. See id. (providing the timeline after the Army Corps rejected the EPA's initial
request as follows: "Six months later, on March 26, 2010, EPA published a notice of its
proposed determination to withdraw or restrict the specification of Seng Camp Creek,
Oldhouse Branch, Pigeonroost Branch, and certain of their tributaries as disposal sites
for fill material. On September 24, 2010 it published a 'Recommended Determination'
to withdraw the specification of Oldhouse Branch, Pigeonroost Branch, and certain of
its tributaries. And [sic] on January 13, 2011, EPA issued its Final
Determination.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 153 (holding that the EPA exceeded its authority under the CWA
when it attempted to invalidate an existing permit for disposal sites because the statute
did not give the EPA the power to render a permit invalid once it had been issued by
the Army Corps).
40. See id. at 139 (asserting that it would be a "stunning power for an agency to
arrogate to itself when there is absolutely no mention of it in the statute").
41.
See id. (focusing on the words "prohibit" and "deny" within the statute as
actions that naturally take place before the end result).
42.
See id. at 148-49 (citing Collins v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit examined the
expansive conjunction "whenever" in its plain meaning.43 By using the
term "whenever," the court decided that Congress plainly intended to grant
the EPA authority to prohibit, deny, restrict, or withdraw a specification at
any time.44 Moreover, it discussed the usage of the word "withdrawal,"
stating that the word itself conveys a meaning that the EPA's power could
only be exercised post-permit. 45 Finding the District Court for the District
of Columbia's argument on legislative history unpersuasive, the D.C.
Circuit reversed and remanded this case of first impression back to the
district court to decide the case on the second claim. 4 6 The specific effects
of this decision will be discussed in Part III, but its strong deviation from
past precedent and sound public policy will have detrimental consequences
for businesses and investors.
II. THE POWER OF ONE WORD: SECTION 404'S AMBIGUOUS USE OF
"WHENEVER" IS AT THE CENTER OF THE DEBATE IN MINGO LOGAN

This Section discusses both courts' decisions and rationales in Mingo
Logan. It explains how the U.S. Court of Appeals' decision ultimately
leaves certain businesses at a disadvantage in the marketplace amidst an
unquantifiable state of uncertainty.
A. Analyzing the Two Federal Courts'InterpretationDisparityRegarding
the Word "Whenever"

This entire issue hinges on the existence and interpretation of the word

(D.C. Cir. 2003)) (noting that the CWA's regulatory regime fits squarely within the
second Collins category of statutes where agencies have specialized enforcement
responsibilities but their authority potentially overlaps); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (setting forth a twopart test for courts to use when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute which it
administers and stating that if a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, then the question for a court is whether the agency's action was based on
a permissible construction of the statute).
43. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014) (pulling the Oxford English Dictionary definition of
"whenever" for support: "At whatever time, no matter when.").
44. See id. (referring to the language of subsection 404(c) as "unambiguous").
45. See id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 449 (2d ed. 1989)) (defining
"withdraw" as "[t]o take back or away (something that has been given, granted,
allowed, possess, enjoyed, or experienced)").

46.

See id. at 616 (holding that the text of § 404(c) clearly and unambiguously

gave the EPA the power to act post-permit and leaving the District Court for the

District of Columbia to decide whether EPA's decision to withdraw site specifications
after a permit's issuance was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act).
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Without the word
"whenever" in section 404(c) of the CWA.47
"whenever," the subsection reads plainly that the EPA Administrator may
act during the application process to prohibit, deny, or restrict disposal sites
from applications.
Adding the single word "whenever" blurs the
acceptable time frame in which the EPA can use its veto power. For
decades, courts never dealt with the interpretation of the word "whenever"
as possibly referring to a post-permit veto power because the EPA never
exercised its power in this manner.4 8 Throughout the proceedings of Mingo
Logan, however, the interpretation of that single word became the debate's
focal point, drawing strong opinions and public discussion from judges,
scholars, and business professionals alike.
For the sake of Mingo Logan, the only interpretations of the word
"whenever" that matter are those used by Judge Amy Jackson and Judge
Karen Henderson of the district court and court of appeals, respectively, in
their opinions. Judge Jackson examined the legislative history behind the
statute and, particularly, section 404(c).49 In rejecting a strict dictionary
definition of the word "whenever," Jackson noted that all parties agreed
that the clear intent in using "whenever" was that Congress gave the EPA
the ability to veto the use of certain disposal sites at the start and during the
application process, thereby blocking the issuance of those permits.50
Judge Henderson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
preferred the literal definition of the word "whenever." 5 Citing the Oxford
English Dictionary, she defined "whenever" in Mingo Logan as "a
qualifying (conditional) clause . . . 'At whatever time, no matter when."' 52

47.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012) ("The Administrator is authorized to

prohibit . . .

,

and

he

is

authorized

to

deny

or

restrict . ..

whenever

he

determines .... ").
48.
See generally Hoosier Envtl. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 105
F. Supp. 2d 953 (S.D. Ind. 2000); City of Alma v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 1546
(S.D. Ga. 1990); Russo Dev. Corp. v. Reilly, No. 87-3916, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15859 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 1990) (providing examples where courts have decided issues
related to the word "whenever" without directly addressing the EPA's post-permit
authority).
49. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2012),
rev'd, 714 F.3d 608 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014) (concluding
that the EPA exceeded its authority under § 404(c) of the CWA "[b]ased upon a
consideration of the provision in question, the language and structure of the entire
statutory scheme, and the legislative history . . . ").
50. See id. at 140 (citing § 1344(a)) ("Since a permit can only be issued by the

Corps for a 'specified' (note the past tense) site, the act of prohibiting a specification,
or denying the use of an area for specification, eliminates the necessary foundation for
the issuance of a permit.").
51.
See 714 F.3d at 613 (indicating that the formulation of the statute with the
word "whenever" is reinforced by the use of the word "withdrawal").
52. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 210 (2d ed. 1989)).
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To further support this interpretation of "whenever," she argued that
subsection 404(c)'s authorization of a "withdrawal" further supported her
interpretation because it is a term of retrospective application allowing a
person or entity to take back or take away something that has been given. 5 3
B. While Antagonistic to Public Policy, the D.C. Circuit'sInterpretation
Passes ConstitutionalMuster andPrevails
If and when the EPA is able to veto permits retrospectively lies in the
existence and statutory interpretation of a single word: "whenever." 54 In
Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court set out a two-step analysis for courts to
use in reviewing an administrative agency's construction of a statute.5 5 A
court must first determine whether Congress directly spoke to the precise
In the midst of unambiguously expressed
question at issue.5 6
Congressional intent, the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
it.5 7 If, however, Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, then the court does not impose its own interpretation of the statute,
but rather, the question becomes whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
When determining whether a statute is silent or ambiguous on the
agency's interpretation in question, courts should use traditional tools of
statutory construction, including the statutory language and legislative
history. Congress is not silent, but instead ambiguous, about when the
EPA can use its veto power in this case; therefore, the statute and its text
can be analyzed one of two ways.60 Based on canons of construction, it can
be evaluated strictly by looking at the language itself, or it can be analyzed

53. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 449 (2d ed. 1989)).
54. See § 1344(c).
55. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that the EPA's decision to allow states to treat all of the pollutionemitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased
within a single "bubble" was based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term
"stationary source").
56. See id. at 842-43, 844 (citing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples'
Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380 (1984) et al.) (supporting the notion that the Court has long
recognized the considerable weight that should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 422 F.3d 1155, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) (noting that this method helps determine whether
Congress had intent on the precise question at issue).
60. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 608, 614-15, cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1540 (2014) (finding none of Mingo Logan Coal Co.'s arguments persuasive
regarding the ambiguity of the statute's language).
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substantively based on the presumptions, values, and intent of Congress at
the time of the statute's passage. 6 1
Typically, a court will assume that the legislature uses words in their
ordinary sense. 62 By ordinary, courts look toward how an "ordinary" or
"reasonable" reader would interpret it while bearing in mind that the
ordinary meaning should be distinguished from a literal meaning, strict
construction, or narrow understanding of the word.63 For example, the
majority in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater
Oregon used a textual construction analysis in finding three reasons for
concluding that the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the word
"harm" within the Endangered Species Act was reasonable.
Substantive canons look toward the presumptions that Congress intended
to incorporate into statutes rather than the plain meaning of the text;
however, presumptions will generally not trump a contrary statutory text,
legislative history, or purpose. 65 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
the Supreme Court decided whether Congress intended the NLRB to have
jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools.
In holding that it
did not, the court recognized that Congress provided no clear expression of
an interpretation to include teachers in church-operated schools, and it
placed weight on the presumption that Congress would not intend for a

61.
See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Admin. for
Children & Families, 556 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land
Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586 (2004)) ("Only if we determine that Congress has
not directly addressed the 'precise question at issue' will we turn to canons of
construction and, if that is unsuccessful, to legislative history 'to see if those
"interpretative clues" permit us to identify Congress's clear intent."').
62. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 849-50 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that judges may consult dictionaries, but

they will often just rely on their linguistic experience or intuition to decide the most
reasonable meaning of the words, given the context in which they are being used and
applied).
63. See id. (suggesting that the interpretation starts with the "prototypical"
meaning of statutory words or the core idea associated with the word or phrase).
64. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687,
697-703 (1995) (concluding that Congress did not unambiguously manifest its intent to
adopt the plaintiffs view and that the Secretary of Interior's interpretation was
reasonable).
65. See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 62, at 883 (citing Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan
Assoc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)) (stating that a presumption or rule of
thumb can be treated as a starting point for discussion, a tiebreaker at the end of
discussion, or just a balancing factor).
66. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 491 (1979) (raising the
additional question that if the Act does in fact authorize such jurisdiction, it must be
determined whether its exercise violates the guarantees of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment).
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statute to violate the Constitution.6 7 The Court, therefore, declined to
construe the Act in a way that could require the Court to resolve difficult
and sensitive First Amendment questions.6 8
In observing the plain, textual meaning of the word "whenever" within
the context of section 404, a definite intention or interpretation is not
obvious. "Whenever" usually carries with it a connotation of "at any time;
on whatever occasion" while emphasizing a lack of restriction. 6 9 The word
does have limitations, however, that are apparent and important in its
everyday usage. 70 For example, when someone tells their neighbor to
"come over whenever," they do not literally mean "at any time." An
understanding exists that the neighbor should not visit during unreasonable
hours or when the home is empty. Did Congress also assume similar
limitations in its use of the word "whenever?" Is it reasonable to "deny or
restrict" the use of certain sites after the application process is over and a
permit has been formally issued? The textual construction is not absolutely
clear. In an instance like this, where the language of a statute is susceptible
to more than one reasonable construction, courts should review the
legislative history of the measure to ascertain its meaning. 7
The legislative history of section 404 does not provide enough insight on
Congress' intention of the word "whenever" to overcome the burden
needed to interpret the word differently than its narrower, ordinary
meaning.7 2 Although no clues exist in the printed U.S. Code Congressional
67.

See id. at 504 ("There is no clear expression of an affirmative intention of

Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by the Act.
Admittedly, Congress defined the Board's jurisdiction in very broad terms; we must
therefore examine the legislative history of the Act to determine whether Congress
contemplated that the grant ofjurisdiction would include teachers in such schools.").
68. See id. at 507 (affirming the decision of the 7th Circuit).
69. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014) (believing that this lack of restriction is why the
Congress intentionally included the word "whenever" within that part of the statute).
70. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Plain Meaning in Context: Can Law Survive Its Own
Language?, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 359, 366 (2011) ("First, the consequences matter;
these words are often designed to structure the social and legal relations between two or
more persons or groups, with the result that any small error can lead to a large amount
of injustice or inefficiency. Second, error correction is not just a matter of asking the
correct question or backspacing on a word processer. The words in question are not
generated by a single person who can alter and change them at will, so their costs of
correction are far greater than before.").
71.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Pearson Ford Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 626 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (citing Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 539
(Cal. 1999)) (analyzing the Automobile Sales Finance Act, legislation enacted to
increase protection for the unsophisticated motor vehicle consumer and provide
additional incentives to dealers to comply with the law).
72. See 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. vol. 2, 3815-20. (providing Congressional and
administrative history for permits and licenses addressed by the CWA but not offering
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and Administrative News with respect to section 404,73 certain pieces of the
CWA's legislative history exist that may help shed light on what exactly
Congress meant by giving the EPA the power to deny or restrict disposal
site specifications "whenever."
When Congress first enacted the CWA, it recognized that a massive
percentage of coal reserves in the United States can only be extracted by
underground mining methods, and so it was vital to national interests to
ensure the existence of an expanding and economically healthy
underground coal mining industry.74
Is it possible Congress can
simultaneously insure an expanding and economically healthy industry75 if
the EPA can use its veto power months or years after the Army Corps
issues a section 404 permit?
Additionally, Senator Edmund Muskie played the most significant role
in the legislation's passage, and he made it clear during a speech to his
Senatorial colleagues that a limitation applies to the EPA's section 404(c)
power. He stated, during consideration of the bill, that the EPA had to
determine that the disposal material would not adversely affect municipal
water supplies "prior to the issuance of any permit."76 Should the
Administrator so determine, then the Army Corps could not issue a
77
permit. Senator Muskie made it apparent in his speech that the EPA may
only deny a permit based on site specifications before it is issued by the
Army Corps.7 8 Later in those same comments, however, Muskie said that
the legislation's drafters tried to write Congress' intent into the CWA as
clearly as possible so that the final evaluation of the bill would not be left
to legislative history.7 9 Why, then, did Congress use the word "whenever"
any information in regards to § 404).
73. See generally 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. vol. 2-3 (omitting any reference to CWA, §
404).
74. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1977) ("The Congress finds and declares
that . .. coal mining operations presently contribute significantly to the Nation's energy
requirements; surface coal mining constitutes one method of extraction of the resource;
the overwhelming percentage of the Nation's coal reserves can only be extracted by
underground mining methods, and it is, therefore, essential to the national interest to
insure the existence of an expanding and economically healthy underground coal
mining industry . . . ."), with § 1201(j) (noting also that "surface and underground coal
mining operations affect interstate commerce, contribute to the economic well-being,
security, and general welfare of the Nation and should be conducted in an
environmentally sound manner" (emphasis added)).
75.
§ 1201(b).
76. Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, s. 2770,
93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 4, 1972), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 177 (1973) (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
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when that seems contrary to Muskie's earlier statement? A court will
subjectively determine how much weight to afford a single Senator's
comments such as those made by Muskie.8 0
Additional history regarding the CWA section at issue exists to further
aid the analysis. During a public comment period regarding section 404 of
the CWA, the EPA publicly stated that it should not invoke its veto power
after a permit is issued except in very rare occurrences. 81 On top of the
above legislative history, the EPA signed a Memorandum of Agreement
with the Department of the Army regarding the EPA's section 404(c)
power.82 Each time the veto power is mentioned in the agreement,
supporting language indicates the power is to be used before a permit is
issued.8 3 The agreement's language supports the notion that the EPA's
authority is to be used prior to a permit's issuance. 84 Thus, although some
legislative history exists, the available information is questionable at best as
to whether it supports a precise Congressional interpretation and intention
of the word "whenever."85
If the text or the legislative history does not provide the court with the

80. See, e.g., Ellen J. Sokol, Note, Environmental Law-Joint and Several
Liability Under CERCLA-United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 57 TEMp. L.Q. 885,
889-90 (1984) (citing Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564
(1976)); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983))
("The court then noted that, while a single legislator's remarks are not controlling, the
statements of legislative sponsors should be given substantial weight.").
81. See Denial or Restriction of Disposal Sites; Section 404(c) Procedures, 44 Fed.
Reg. 196 (proposed Oct. 9, 1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 231) ("[I]t would be
inappropriate to use 404(c) after issuance of a permit where the matters at issue were
reviewed by EPA without objections during the permit proceeding, or where the
matters at issue were resolved to EPA's satisfaction during the permit proceeding,
unless substantial new information is first brought to the Agency's attention after
issuance." (emphasis added)).
82. See generally Memorandum of Agreement Between the EPA and the Dep't of
the
Army
(Aug.
11,
1992),
available
at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/1992_MOA 404q.pdf
83. See id. ("[T]he District Engineer will provide EPA a copy of the Statement of
Findings/Record of Decision prepared in support of a permit decision after the
[Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works'] review. The permit shall not be
issued during a period of 10 calendar days after such notice unless it contains a
condition that no activity may take place pursuant to the permit until such 10th day, or
if the EPA has initiated a Section 404(c) proceeding during such 10 day period, until
the Section 404(c) proceeding is concluded and subject to the final determination in
such a proceeding.").
84. See id. (indicating that absent exigent circumstances, retrospectively invoking
§ 404(c) would be inappropriate).
85. Cf Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005) (quoting Union Bank
v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991)) ("The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all
of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to
give effect to its plain meaning.").
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necessary interpretation, then under Chevron the second question for the
court is whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. The EPA argued in Mingo Logan that section
404(c) grants it unlimited power to modify or revoke a permit that the
Army Corps lawfully issues. The district court was not persuaded, even if
considerable deference was given to the EPA's interpretation.
The EPA specifically addressed the concept of taking no action postpermit during Mingo Logan Coal's permit application process.89 When the
EPA issued state certification for Mingo Logan Coal's individual permit, it
stated via an email from William Hoffman, Director of the Office of
Environmental Programs, Environmental Assessment and Innovation
Division, of the EPA, to Teresa Spagna of the Army Corps, that the EPA
had no intention of taking its concerns any further from a section 404
standpoint. 90 Hoffman sent that email one year before the Army Corps
issued Mingo Logan Coal its final permit and five years before the EPA
invoked its veto power to retrospectively revoke certain disposal sites.9 1
The permit issued to Mingo Logan Coal contained an express
notification that the Huntington District Office of the Army Corps had the
right to reevaluate its decision at any time circumstances warranted.92 In
2009, almost two years after the Army Corps issued the section 404 permit,
the EPA sent a letter to the Huntington District Office recommending that
the Army Corps use its discretionary authority to suspend, revoke, or
modify Mingo Logan Coal's permit. 9 3 The Army Corps rejected the EPA's

86. See Chcvron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) ("If... the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.").
87. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 139 (D.D.C. 2012),
rev'd, 714 F.3d 608, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014) ("[T]he
EPA is permitted to withdraw its assent to a disposal site at any time, even if the
agency did not exercise its authority to prohibit or deny the specification at the outset,
and a permit has already been issued.").
88. See id. (reasoning that the EPA's "reading does not exactly leap off the page").
89. See id. at 136 (referring to William Hoffman's email to Teresa Spagna).
90.
See id. (citing Administrative Record 23085) (emphasizing that the EPA
intended to work alongside the Army Corps throughout the application process rather
than invoke § 404(c)'s veto power).
91.
See id. at 136-37 (explaining that the original email was sent November 2,
2006; the permit was delivered on January 22, 2007; and the EPA's Final
Determination to "withdraw the . .. disposal site[s]" was issued January 13, 2011).
92.
See id. at 137 (implying that the permit did not mention the EPA's ability to
withdraw the specification of a disposal site or to modify or revoke the permit after its
issuance).
93. See id. (stating that the letter was sent on September 3, 2009); see also 33
C.F.R. § 325.7(c)-(d) (2013) ("The district engineer may suspend a permit after
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request, finding no grounds to do so.94
Contract law provides one potential basis for the illegality of the EPA's
ability to revoke permits after issuance as it did in Mingo Logan Coal's
case. The section 404 permit to mine at Spruce No. I was the result of a
contract under which Mingo Logan Coal had a reasonable expectation that
it would be able to dispose of material for the permit's duration. Mingo
Logan Coal's acceptance of the permit was based on the EPA's statements
that expressed intent not to exercise § 404(c) power retrospectively. 95 On
multiple occasions, noted above, the EPA indicated its intention to exercise
section 404(c) power only prior to a permit's issuance by the Army
Corps.96 The Fifth Amendment's "takings clause" 97 provides a second
potential basis for the illegality of retrospectively vetoing section 404
permits. By revoking disposal sites post-issuance, the EPA deprives the
business enterprise of the entire economic value of the land, and the
business deserves, at the least, just compensation. 98
As stated in various cases since Chevron, in construing a statute, the
court should consider the history and consistent purpose of the legislation
and discover the policy of the legislature as disclosed by the course of the
legislation and not the agency or third parties after its passage. 99 Although
preparing a written determination and finding that immediate suspension would be in
the public interest. The district engineer will notify the permittee in writing by the
most expeditious means available that the permit has been suspended with the reasons
therefore, and order the permittee to stop those activities previously authorized by the
Following completion of the suspension procedures in
suspended permit . . ..
paragraph (c) of this section, if revocation of the permit is found to be in the public
interest, the authority who made the decision on the original permit may revoke it.").
94. See 850 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (disagreeing with the EPA's assertion that recent
data and analyses had revealed downstream water quality impacts that were not
adequately addressed by the permit).
95. See, e.g., GREGORY KLASS, CONTRACT LAW IN THE USA 63-87 (2010)
(defining contract formation as offer, acceptance, consideration, and intent to create
legal relations).
96. See 850 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (email from Mr. Hoffman to Teresa Spagna). See
generally Denial or Restriction of Disposal Sites; Section 404(c) Procedures, 44 Fed.
Reg. 196 (proposed Oct. 9, 1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 231); Memorandum
of Agreement Between the EPA and the Dep't of the Army, supra note 82.
97. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
98. But see Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1290-92 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992))
(finding that the plaintiffs § 404 permit met the only exception to compensation for
such categorical takings: "where the regulations prohibit a use that was not part of the
landowner's title to being with; that is, a limitation that inheres 'in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership').
99. See, e.g., United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 53-55 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1986)) (holding that the legislative history of § 3144 made
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the Court of Appeal's decision in Mingo Logan at first seems to be
inconsistent with how the EPA has historically portrayed its authority, the
correct interpretation can be found in the legislative process. According to
Chevron, 00 the textual meaning of the statute along with the legislative
history is the deciding factor, and based on those two canons, there is
simply not enough information to deem the EPA's interpretation of the
statute unreasonable after providing due deference.1 or
The next Section of this Comment delves into the risk, uncertainty, and
negative outcomes that accompany affirming the EPA's interpretation of its
section 404(c) power, but based on the above analysis, the U.S. Court of
Appeals appears to have correctly analyzed the EPA's authority strictly
under Chevron. The court failed, however, by not addressing that the
EPA's interpretation of its power, as explained in the next Section, will
lead to an absurd result that businesses and investors will inevitably find
disconcerting. When this is the case, the courts have a duty to consider
common sense and public welfare.1 0 2
C. The D.C. Circuit'sInterpretationNonetheless will have a Deleterious
Effect on Businesses Across the United States because of the Vast
Uncertainty and Risk they now Face

At the micro level, the EPA's decision to withdraw two of Mingo Logan
Coal's disposal sites and their tributaries from its permit was detrimental.103
clear Congress' intent to include grand jury proceedings within the definition of
"criminal proceeding" while indicating that although committee reports are not always
reliable interpretive tools, courts may look to them in discerning Congressional intent).
100. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (setting out the two-step test discussed throughout this Comment).
101. See id. at 844 ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer .... ).
102. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("In my view § 7 cannot reasonably be interpreted as applying to a project
that is completed or substantially completed when its threat to an endangered species is
discovered. Nor can I believe that Congress could have intended this Act to produce
the 'absurd result' - in the words of the District Court - of this case. If it were clear
from the language of the Act and its legislative history that Congress intended to
authorize this result, this Court would be compelled to enforce it. It is not our province
to rectify policy or political judgments by the Legislative Branch, however egregiously
they may disserve the public interest. But where the statutory language and legislative
history, as in this case, need not be construed to reach such a result, I view it as the duty
of this Court to adopt a permissible construction that accords with some modicum of
common sense and the public weal.").
103. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012),
rev'd, 714 F.3d 608, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014)
(acknowledging that the EPA seized "eighty-eight percent of the total discharge area
authorized by the permit").
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If Mingo Logan Coal was able to predict the outcome of this case, it could
have applied for after-the-fact permits at other locations,104 cut back on
human capital or other expenses, or simply begun to minimize its
production numbers. The unpredictability of the EPA's move left Mingo
Logan Coal with its metaphorical hands tied tightly behind its back. The
Spruce No. 1 Mine was one of the Appalachian Mountains' largest surface
mining operations ever. 0 5 Recognizing that the EPA's decision would
force Mingo Logan Coal and other companies to cut production and lay off
employees at an incredibly damaging rate, leading to financial difficulty,
members of Congress immediately responded with legislation that would
prevent the EPA from vetoing section 404 permits after the permits have
been issued by the Army Corps. 06
At a macro level, thousands of companies in the U.S., including those
companies' investors, might now find themselves in Mingo Logan Coal's
position.
Not only do they now face an unthinkable amount of
complication to every investment and business decision, but also, they face
one of an unquantifiable type. o7
In Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, economist Frank Knight thoroughly
discusses the difference between risk and uncertainty.1os Put simply, risk

involves outcomes delimited by a known probability distribution, while
uncertainty means that the probability distribution of outcomes is
unknown.' 09 When Alan Greenspan chaired the Federal Reserve Board, he
104. See, e.g., Russo Dev. Corp. v. Reilly, No. 87-3916, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15859, *6-7 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 1990) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(p) (2012)) (recognizing
that once a party obtains an after-the-fact permit from the Army Corps of Engineers,
the EPA cannot commence an enforcement action and stating that "[i]f EPA cannot
proceed under its authority under Section 404(c), then [it] is absolutely precluded from
seeking restoration or mitigation to halt or offset the adverse effects of the discharge").
105. Amy Oxley, Comment, No Longer Mine: An Extensive Look at the
Environmental ProtectionAgency's Veto of the Section 404 Permit Held by the Spruce
No. I Mine, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 139, 148 (2011).
106. Compare H.R. 457, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced on January 26, 2011, but
not enacted), with S. 272, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced on February 3, 2011, but not
enacted).
107. See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 916-17 (2011) (noting
that even though the precautionary principle attempts to provide for a safety net against
uncertainty, "government intervention creates risks of its own, [which] are also
uncertain and present unforeseen risks to health and environment," thereby turning the
precautionary principle against itself).
108. See generally FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 367 (1921)
(explaining that while risk presents itself when a company faces possibilities whose
odds are discernible, uncertainty, on the other hand, deals with possibilities whose odds
are unknown, or where "the possible outcomes themselves are a matter of
speculation").
109. Alan Greenspan, Innovation and Issues in Monetary Policy: the Last Fifteen
Years, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 33, 36-37 (2004) ("In practice, one is never quite sure what
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stated that reducing uncertainty, deemed Knightian uncertainty, was one of
his primary objectives with regard to the overall marketplace." 0 Knightian
uncertainty, because of its unpredictability, can cause both high inflation
rates and stock market crashes, and too much can have profound effects on
economic development, as it stifles investment and generates unnecessary
losses.!1 1 Professor Dru Stevenson noted that uncertainty is a trait
businesses attempt to avoid, and the possible consequences of uncertainty
are often negative.112 Knight, Greenspan, and Stevenson would likely
agree that allowing the EPA to retrospectively veto section 404 site
specifications introduces a dangerous amount of uncertainty into the
marketplace that will cause investors to take their resources out of
industries that are regulated by section 404 of the CWA."
Businesses today have enough uncertainty and risk to consider; an
unpredictable regulatory framework is an unnecessary, additional
burden.' 14 Industries must consider where they stand in the midst of a
globalized market that relies heavily on cutting-edge technology and
political divisions."'5 At a time when businesses need to be able to rely on

type of uncertainty one is dealing with in real time, and it may be best to think of a
continuum ranging from well-defined risks to the truly unknown.").
110. See id. at 37-40 ("In pursuing a risk-management approach to policy, we must
confront the fact that only a limited number of risks can be quantified with any
confidence. And even these risks are generally quantifiable only if we accept the
assumption that the future will, at least in some important respects, resemble the past.
Policy-makers often have to act, or choose not to act, even though we may not fully
understand the full range of possible outcomes, let alone each possible outcome's
likelihood. As a result, risk management often involves significant judgment as we
evaluate the risks of different events and the probability that our actions will alter those
risks.").
111. See id. at 38 ("When confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian
uncertainty, human beings invariably attempt to disengage from medium- to long-term
commitments in favor of safety and liquidity.").
112. See Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v.
EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 66 (2007) ("People are intuitively averse to uncertainty,
even more than they are averse to risk. They will steer their resources away from it
when possible. The possibility of sudden, radical moves by any governmental branch
introduces genuine uncertainty into many facets of society.").
113. See generally Knight, supra note 108; Greenspan, supra note 109; Stevenson,
supra note 112.
114. See Christian Engau & Volker H. Hoffmann, Strategizing in an Unpredictable
Climate: Exploring Corporate Strategies to Cope with Regulatory Uncertainty, 44
LONG RANGE PLANNING 42, 43 (2011) (explaining that policymakers' decisions to
establish new regulation aimed at intervening into firms' traditional business operations
pose a considerable risk for firms and expose them to high regulatory uncertainty).
115. See Chris Arnold, Business Leaders Decry the Economic Cost of Uncertainty,
NPR, Oct. 19, 2013, http://www.kqed.org/news/story/2013/10/19/12732 1/business
leaders decry the economic cost of uncertainty?category=economy
("Running a
company is like driving a car. You need to be able to see what's coming down the

478

AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA WREVIEW

Vol. 3:3

government and its agencies to provide them with a sense of stability and
foundation upon which to build, they are left in the dark, adding regulatory
distrust to their list of uncertainties when making all business-related
decisions." 6
Professor Rebecca Bratspies recognized this problem and offered a
solution; one that, although readily applied, may not be able to fix the
unpredictability left by the U.S. Court of Appeals' decision in Mingo
Logan."7 She describes the risks and uncertainties that already exist in
today's business world, and she explains how the growing distrust between
business and government unproductively taints an otherwise stable
relationship." Regulatory uncertainty both erodes the public's trust and
alienates citizens from decision-making institutions, like the EPA."l 9 To
regain social resiliency, institutions must make decisions amidst
uncertainty to create a more inclusive and transparent regulatory scheme.
Without definitive decision-making, however, businesses and citizens
begin to distrust those institutions that are meant to help them. This
distrust is detrimental to regulatory value in the present and in the future.120
For industries and agencies where an amicable relationship is possible,
Bratspies offers a simple yet underrated solution: trust.121 She explains that
trust is a crucial resource for responding to uncertainty and lays out the
ideal version of that trust narrative in a mutual understanding between the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and those who take medicines that
could be deadly but are monitored closely by the FDA.122 As it applies to
road. The dysfunction in Washington has created a fog, aiid when driving in the fog,
you have to slow down.").
116. See id. (providing examples of both small and large businesses that are
strongly affected by decisions in Washington); cf Engau & Hoffman, supra note 114,
at 43 ("[I]ncreasing international regulation for trade, social, and natural environmental
purposes exposes firms to continuous uncertainty, so that, more than ever, coping with
this uncertainty constituted a fundamental challenge for them.").
117. See Rebecca Bratspies, Perspectives on the New Regulatory Era: Regulatory
Trust, 51 ARIz. L. REv. 575, 603 (2009) (laying the foundation for "regulatory trust").
118. See id. at 577 (noting that "[njot only are particular regulatory decisions woven
together from strands of uncertainty, but so, too, are the scope and direction of the
regulatory endeavor itself").
119. See id.
120. See id. ("Loss of trust undermines regulatory effectiveness and diminishes
society's overall capacity to persevere and even thrive in the face of multiple,
unpredictable risks.").
121. See id. at 584 ("A reservoir of social trust helps societies remain stable even as
administrators make decisions against this overwhelming net of uncertainty.").
122. See id. ("The [FDA]'s perceived rigor creates a mantle of trustworthiness that
can vouch for the conduct of third parties, thereby facilitating desirable social
outcomes. Social trust can thus stabilize ambiguous situations by increasing society's
ability to tolerate uncertainty.").
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CWA, section 404, Bratspies' solution of regulatory trust is invoked every
time the EPA makes a decision not to interfere in a business' permit in
spite of some conditions of uncertainty as to how a project may ultimately
affect the environment, both natural and wildlife.' 23 She would argue that a
loss of trust between the EPA and business entities that must apply for a
section 404 permit undermines the regulatory effectiveness of the CWA as
well as these businesses' ability to succeed in the face of other
unpredictable risks inherent in carrying out business operations. 124In a
world full of perfectly rational actors, Bratspies' solution may carry more
weight than it does in reality.
Contrary to Bratspies' solution, Mingo Logan Coal cannot be blamed for
any distrust toward the EPA from this point forward. Other companies and
businesses applying for a section 404 permit will not trust the EPA either
due to its unprecedented move in retrospectively revoking Mingo Logan
Coal's permit.125 As long as the EPA has this unlimited veto power, not
only is regulatory trust unviable as a possible solution, but also, a growing
distrust will further smear an already rocky relationship between the federal
agency and industries across the country. 2 6
Ironically, the EPA has acknowledged and addressed the role that
uncertainty and risk play in creating and reforming its own public policy.12 7
The EPA, however, enjoys the advantage of data analysis not available for
those business entities that its veto power can potentially destroy.128 Only
the EPA itself can provide any data or improved information to potentially
help businesses predict if and when the EPA will use its veto power. Its
decision to invoke section 404(c) is not a scientific equation businesses can
readily crack; the uncertainty involved can only be resolved by the EPA
123.

See id. at 575.

124.

See id.

125. See generally Brief for The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellee, Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. EPA, 714 F.3d 608 (2013)
(No. 12-5150), 2012 WL 4960379.
126. See Bratspies, supra note 117, at 577 (indicating that a loss of trust diminishes
businesses' ability to persevere).
127. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING
RISK ANALYSIS APPROACH USED BY THE U.S. EPA (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region9/science/seminars/2012/advancing-risk-assessment.pdf
(listing a number of substantial challenges it faces similar to industries affected by §
404, "including long delays in completing complex risk assessments, some of which
take decades to complete; lack of data, which leads to important uncertainty in risk
assessments; and the need for risk assessment of many unevaluated chemicals in the
marketplace and emerging agents").
128. See id. (considering uncertainty and variability throughout the risk-assessment
process but dismissing their irreparable effect because "uncertainty can be reduced by
the use of more or better data . .. [and v]ariability cannot be reduced, but it can be
better characterized with improved information").
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absent the intervention of Congress or future court decisions.
Other authors have also written about the negative consequences of
uncertainty, particularly within the realm of government regulation.12 9
Under the auspices of contract law, Professor Alex Seita points out that the
bargain theory provides for a mutually exclusive exchange between two
parties.130 Once a party omits certain calculated risks, he finds an estimate
of his expected gain from the bargain, but it will be "very much in error
when unfavorable outcomes actually occur."1 31 If one party breaches the
contract, the law will enforce the contract by awarding a remedy despite
unanticipated circumstances.1 32 Even if a CWA section 404 permit is
considered a contract between a company and the federal government via
the Army Corps and the EPA, the agreement lacks a similar remedy to
provide insurance for businesses in the case of unanticipated
circumstances. 33
Businesses and investors are left with no safety net if they find
themselves in a Mingo Logan situation. When government or an affiliated
agency suddenly changes a policy, as the EPA did by exerting its power in
an unprecedented way, it creates a new uncertainty businesses never
encountered.134 The EPA and the U.S. Court of Appeals have placed an
undue burden on businesses of not only hedging uncertainty from the
market, but also, the uncertainty that accompanies the EPA's capricious
authority.
The analysis provided above regarding uncertainty, risk, and its

129. See Farber, supra note 107, at 909 (describing a policy of ignoring all
nonquantifiable harms as "literally a recipe for disaster"); see also Alex Y. Seita,
Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 75, 90-91 (1984) (noting that in
contract law the more relevant information a party acquires before making a contract,
the better able he is to protect himself against or to prevent dangerous outcomes); cf
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509, 527
(1986) (focusing on two consequences of changes in government policy, including the
imposition of risk and modification of incentives to engage in affected activities).
130. See Seita, supra note 129, at 84-85 ("The bargain theory of contracts assumes
that in a voluntary exchange, each party to a contract will seek to maximize his own
welfare, for no rational individual will ever voluntarily place himself into a position in
which he is worse off.").
131. See id. at 87 (explaining that unfavorable outcomes transform a contract that
once promised an attractive profit into something that burdens the profit with a loss).
132. See id. (negating the losses felt by the party suffering unanticipated
circumstances).
133. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (including no language regarding remedy,
reparation, restitution, or compensation).
134. See Kaplow, supra note 129, at 532 (observing that businesses are unfamiliar
with having to juggle both market-created risks and government-created risks and
noting that "[m]ost risks in society are not attributable to uncertainty concerning future
government action").
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detrimental effects to a business' investments will be recognized and feared
by businesses everywhere now that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia's decision stands.' 3 5 In a Brief of Amici Curiae in
support of Mingo Logan Coal, business groups ranging from the Chamber
of Commerce and American Farm Bureau Federation to the Associated
General Contractors of America and the National Mining Association
joined together to persuade the Court of Appeals to rule against the EPA.136
The brief analyzed the practical consequences of an adverse ruling,
including its effects on activities as diverse as the entities that signed onto
the brief, ranging from construction and transportation to agriculture and
manufacturing; these industries invest hundreds of billions of dollars in the
U.S. economy.13 7 It declared that the EPA's action injected a new and
untenable level of uncertainty into thousands of project proponents'
investment planning processes.' 38 Regarding the investment risk, the brief
provides hard-number examples supporting its claims.13 9 Ultimately, it
concluded that an interpretation of section 404(c) that fundamentally
contradicts the concept of permit finality dramatically changes the way
project proponents view their investments and should not be considered
reasonable under step two of the Supreme Court's Chevron framework. 140

135. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014) ("Petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
denied.").
136. See Brief for The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellee, Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. EPA, 714 F.3d 608 (2013) (No.
12-5150), 2012 WL 4960379, *2 ("Decreased investment in Section 404 permitdependent projects will not only directly harm the vast array of industries whose
operations require Section 404 permits, but will also result in less growth in numerous
other sectors of the economy, since projects that require a Section 404 permit
frequently provide substantial downstream economic benefits.").
137. See id. at *1, 3 (using as an example the American Road and Transportation
Builders Association's (ARTBA) statement that "[i]f the Clean Water Act processes
ARTBA members have come to rely upon are disturbed by EPA's unprecedented
modification of a previously issued Section 404 permit, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for ARTBA members to rely upon Clean Water Act permits to both build
transportation improvements and accomplish environmental objectives through
mitigation").
138. Id. at *1.
139. See id. at *17 ("[I]f a project proponent faces a one percent chance that EPA
would act under Section 404(c) after the permit issues, it would decrease the expected
cost-benefit ratio for the project by 17.5%. A two percent chance that EPA would take
adverse action - not an unrealistic assumption for a large or controversial project would decrease the project's cost-benefit ratio by 30%.").
140. See id. at *22 ("Every project proponent that is contemplating an investment
contingent on a Section 404 permit would have to recalculate the costs and benefits of
investing, and many would undoubtedly decide that the inability to ever fully rely on a
Section 404 permit tips the scales against investing.").
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III. COURTS CAN PROVIDE A TEMPORARY SOLUTION, BUT ONLY
CONGRESS CAN ELIMINATE UNCERTAINTY BY REMOVING AMBIGUITY
FROM THE STATUTE'S PROVISION

One of the most difficult aspects of enforcing and abiding by legislation
is its lack of clarity and the broad application of the language. The CWA,
for example, applies to many types of industries that engage in different
practices, so it becomes extremely difficult to take the language of one
statute and apply it across the board to every entity. A statute like section
404 that contains some ambiguity becomes even more complicated when it
is applied to many businesses, enforced by agencies with changing
leadership, and interpreted by courts with ideologies that shift as often as
the membership.
Beyond the clarity and broad application, it is difficult to interpret and
apply language written in the 1970s to such a globalized, twenty-first
century world. In terms of research alone, it becomes problematic to
decipher Congress' intent when documents, transcripts, and reports are not
readily available online or printed and available in law libraries. When
section 404 was originally enacted in 1972, it affected how businesses
moved forward with projects, but in no way did it affect such an array of
industries to the degree that it does today. The businesses that must apply
for a section 404 permit, those that now must worry about the EPA's
volatile veto power, pump hundreds of billions of dollars into the U.S.
economy, 14 ' and that money and those jobs hinge on a single word written
somewhat haphazardly over forty years ago.
It is time for Congress, the body who created the issue in the first place,
to fix the problem. It constantly amends sections of the CWA, the most
recent of which is still pending in our slow and politically fractured
legislative branch. The time it would take to propose an amendment and
push it through Congress will be immensely rewarding to those businesses
who are simply trying to do what they do best: employ workers, stimulate
the market-driven economy, and advance society.
This Comment recommends that Congress amend section 404(c) of the
CWA to remove any ambiguous language relating to the EPA's power to
deny or restrict certain disposal site specifications. 142 By amending the
141. See id. at *1(listing not only the types of activities and industries involved but
also the amount of investments they facilitate).
142. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012) ("Denial or restriction of use of defined areas
as disposal sites.

The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification

(including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and he
is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including
the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice
and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of such materials into such area
will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds
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statute to remedy the unpredictable interpretation of the EPA's power, this
Comment recommends amending section 404(c) so that the affected and
pertinent language reads as follows:
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including
the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site,
and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for
specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal
site, [if] he determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearings,
[but before the issuance of a permit by the Secretary in accordance with
Section 404(b),] that the discharge of such materials into such area will
have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . , wildlife, or recreational areas.

Before makin such determination, the Administrator shall consult with
the Secretary.
As evidenced by the proposed language, the EPA's approval of the
application should be a condition precedent to the Army Corps' approval
rather than an arbitrary, and possibly infinite, veto power. The statute
originally created a working relationship between the Army Corps and the
EPA, and this proposal may heighten tension between the two agencies
while placing yet another check on the EPA's authority.
The recent U.S. Court of Appeals decision,14 4 a case of first impression,
may not have purported the EPA's interpretation of section 404(c) as
unconstitutional, but it certainly sets an uncomfortable precedent for
business industries all over the U.S. If another case similar to Mingo
Logan reaches the federal system before the legislative branch acts, this
Comment recommends that courts rule similar to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia in Mingo Logan with a heavy emphasis and
discussion on policy.14 5 The policy behind a decision like this involves
eliminating the complete uncertainty businesses will face if the EPA
eternally carries veto power over any section 404 permit. It involves
promoting business activity and economic stimulation while diminishing
the disillusionment experienced by companies like Mingo Logan Coal Co.

and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational
areas. Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult with the
Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth in writing and make public his findings
and his reasons for making any determination under this subsection.").
143. See id. (emphasis added) (proposed text in brackets).
144. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 608, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
denied 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014) (holding that the text of § 404(c) clearly and
unambiguously gave the EPA the power to act post-permit).
145. See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2012),
rev'd, 714 F.3d 608, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014)

(holding that the CWA does not give EPA the power to render a permit invalid once it
has been issued by the Army Corps).
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It is about ensuring that the American Dream cannot be held hostage by
federal agencies such as the EPA. While the analysis used by the district
court may not hold constitutional muster, especially given the Chevron
analysis, courts should use the abovementioned obvious public policy and
equity analyses available to further support a conclusion that the EPA
should not have this type of power and that section 404 did not intend to
give it such overarching influence. 146
Businesses who are egregiously affected by an EPA action can find
remedy in a civil case against the EPA, one that the Supreme Court has
recently found not barred by the CWA.14 7 Although the plaintiffs in
Sackett v. EPA were harmed by the EPA's issuance of a CWA section 309
administrative compliance, they used the courts for a remedy similar to
what businesses harmed by a section 404(c) issuance could seek. 14 8 If a
court allows a similar civil remedy with respect to section 404, then
businesses harmed by the EPA and its section 404(c) power could file a
new wave of cases.
Courts cannot be relied upon forever to provide remedies in the
potentially infinite number of lawsuits arising from section 404. It is up to
Congress to ultimately alleviate ambiguity and amend the statute to
comport with the original intent of section 404(c). It must ensure the
economic vitality of business industries while keeping a keen eye on
possible detrimental effects to the environment prior to the issuance of §
404 permits.

146. Business industries recently found themselves on the losing side of a legal
battle with the EPA once again in National Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, Nos. 12-53 10,
12-5311, 2014 WL 3377245, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2014). This case analyzed the
2009 Enhanced Coordination Process adopted by the Army Corps and the EPA to
facilitate their consideration of certain CWA permits, including those regulated by
section 404. The District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs, the States of West Virginia and Kentucky along with coal mining
companies and trade associations, that challenged this procedure and the EPA's Final
Guidance. 880 F. Supp. 2d 119, 141-42 (D.D.C. 2012). The same federal court of
appeals that ruled in favor of the EPA in Mingo Logan, however, reversed and
remanded the decision of the district court in National Mining Ass'n as well, holding
that the CWA did not prohibit the interagency plan for enhanced consultation and
coordination with respect to applications and permits and that the EPA's Final
Guidance was not legislative rule subject to judicial review. 2014 WL 3377245, at *8.
147. See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012) (concluding that the
compliance order is final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy other
than APA review and that the CWA does not preclude that review).
148. See id. at 1372 (agreeing with the plaintiffs that the order was "'arbitrary [and]
capricious' under the Administrative Procedure Act ... and that it deprived them of
'life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.").
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CONCLUSION
For decades, the CWA section 404 was just another red tape permit
businesses needed to obtain before beginning projects that involved the
disposal of dredged or fill materials in any U.S. waters or wetlands. The
EPA never used its power governed by section 404(c) to revoke a permit
that had already been issued by the Army Corps until recently. This
retrospective permit revocation had deleterious effects on one particular
company, but the frightening and unpredictable potential effects will be felt
by businesses across the U.S.
Section 404(c) sets forth the ability of the EPA to deny certain disposal
sites within a business' application. It tasks the EPA Administrator with
notifying and working alongside the Secretary of the Army, acting through
the Chief of Engineers, before that authority is used. If Congress could
have predicted Mingo Logan on a federal court's docket, then it may have
decided differently when constructing the language found within the
statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals' recent unprecedented ruling will have
a destructive effect on certain business industries that pump hundreds of
billions of dollars into the United States economy.
The courts and, ultimately, Congress should provide additional guidance
as to how and when the EPA can invoke its section 404(c) veto power. The
ability of Congress to slightly amend the language as recommended earlier
in this Comment could make all the difference. Its action, which is needed
immediately, would be a simple solution to a complex and dangerous
problem, a problem with a potential for havoc that has yet to be fully
realized.

